Creating DNA out of almost nothing at all

The San Diego Union has a well-written article on the incredible promise and terrifying possibilities that come with "synthetic biology. The first graphs are below:

For decades, biologists have modified plants and animals by snipping genes from one organism and popping them into another in a process called genetic engineering. Corn will produce its own pesticide – a toxin harmful to caterpillars – when spiked with a bacterial gene. And copies of the human gene for insulin have been slipped into bacteria, transforming them into biological drug factories and reducing the need to extract the hormone from slaughtered pigs.

Until recently, those useful genes had to be found in nature and transferred from one organism to another. Now our ability to manipulate biology to suit our needs has taken a startling new turn. Scientists are using custom-designed DNA, synthesized from scratch, to create novel biological "circuits" they hope will do anything they can program them to do.

Their goal is to plan new biological tasks, such as detecting pathogens and rendering them harmless, with the kind of precision and control exercised by designers of electrical circuits. They call themselves synthetic biologists, and they have set out to engineer life.

Is this a good idea? The goals sound promising: create tiny packets that travel through the bloodstream to find and treat diseased cells, design cells to generate replacement organs or bridge a severed spinal cord, weave high-tech fabrics of proteins from spider silk.

These possibilities have arisen largely from technical advances over the past few years that have made chemical synthesis of DNA relatively inexpensive. Custom-designed DNA is available by mail and can be ordered through the Internet. Researchers specify the sequence of the gene they desire and pay as little as a dollar per letter of the genetic code.

The problem is that the sequences of dangerous things, such as the virus that caused the 1918 influenza pandemic, are public knowledge. Some worry that a renegade group of synthetic biologists could unleash something horrifying.

"In an overall sense, the security situation is grave," said Roger Brent, president and CEO of Molecular Science Institute in Berkeley. "One can re-synthesize flu. The people who call themselves synthetic biologists didn't bring this situation about, but they bear some measure of the responsibility for keeping us safe."